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ABSTRACT
The America Invents Act has put in place quick and efficient mechanisms for challenging granted
patents in an Article I adversarial setting. And the Hatch-Waxman Act has been the roadmap for
generic drug approval-related patent infringement action in Article III courts. An interesting,
heretofore unaddressed question lurks at an intersection of the two pieces of enterprising legislation:
What impact should a final decision canceling patent claims under the AIA setting have on the
forfeiture of 180-day exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman Act? The 180-day exclusivity is an
important piece in the Hatch-Waxman game of chess. This comment presents both the case for and
against pulling the forfeiture trigger on the 180-day exclusivity via the new AIA setting. Going
further, the comment highlights pragmatic and policy justifications for pulling the trigger, thereby
proposing grounds for a conformant legislative action.
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PULLING THE 'TRIGGER' ON THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT'S 180-DAY
EXCLUSIVITY USING INTER PARTES REVIEW
JAIMIN SHAH*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States healthcare system has enjoyed enormous savings in the last
three decades due to reduced drug costs,1 thanks to the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act).2
The Hatch-Waxman Act is the reason American consumers have had greater access to
lower-cost generic drugs.3 At the same time, the Act is also the force behind pioneer
drug companies’ continued incentive to research and develop new drugs. 4 The Act
finely balances the competing interests of pharmaceutical companies in manifold ways.
Among the balancing mechanisms of the Act is one that effectuates resolution of patent
issues.5
A generic drug manufacturer can initiate challenges to unexpired patents
covering a pioneer drug even while the manufacturer’s application for regulatory
approval is pending review.6 The first generic company to file such a patent challenge
(hereinafter, “first filer”) is awarded a 180-day market exclusivity.7 The 180-day
exclusivity sticks out as a carrot. The idea is to incentivize early patent challenges and
thereby accelerate the market entry of lower-cost generic drugs.8 The incentive,
however, is counterbalanced by the Act’s forfeiture provision.
* © Jaimin Shah 2015. J.D. Candidate December 2015, The John Marshall Law School-Chicago.
Mr. Shah has a Master of Science in Biotechnology from the Indian Institute of Technology-Bombay.
Prior to law school, Mr. Shah worked in the Intellectual Property division of a pharmaceutical
company in Mumbai, India.
1 See, e.g., John E. Dicken, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-12-371R, Drug Pricing:
Research on Savings from Generic Drug Use 4 (2012) (estimating that between 1999 and 2010, generic
substitution accounted for more than $ 1 trillion in savings).
2 Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc (2000), 35 U.S.C.
§§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)), as amended by the Medicare, Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. N. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003)).
3 GAO-12-371R at 1 (reporting that the on the average, the retail price of a generic drug is 75 per
cent lower).
4 Christopher Ohly & Sailesh K. Patel, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Prescriptions for Innovative and
Inexpensive Medicines, 19 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 107, 107-08, 113-15, 127 (2011) (imputing
“gains in research intensity of the pharmaceutical industry” to the Act’s provisions that extend patent
terms lost due to delay in FDA approval of branded drugs and that confer non-patent data exclusivities
such as the New Chemical Entity exclusivity).
5 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2012); id. §§ 355 (j)(5)(B)-(D).
6 See id. § 355(j)(2) (setting forth in the same subsection regulatory as well as certification and
notice letter requirements, the latter of which is a predicate to patent infringement litigation under
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)); see also Ohly & Patel, supra note 4, at 116-17 (explaining generally the
paragraph-IV certification process as part of an ANDA application that typically triggers a patent
infringement action).
7 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012) (requiring that during the 180-day exclusivity period, no
subsequent generic applicant can be given regulatory approval).
8 See Ohly & Patel, supra note 4, at 117-18; David E. Korn et. al., A New History and Discussion
of 180-Day Exclusivity, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 335 (2009).
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A first filer’s 180-day exclusivity is not iron-clad; it is susceptible to being triggered
and even forfeited by certain events. 9 For example, a generic manufacturer with a
subsequently initiated patent challenge (hereinafter, “second filer”) may win its
challenge and force the first filer to launch its product quickly or forfeit its
exclusivity.10 Again, such forfeiture would be consistent with the goal of accelerating
generic drug commercialization. A question of first impression is what impact, if any,
administrative adjudication of patent validity should have in this exclusivity
forfeiture scheme.
The relatively recent America Invents Act (hereinafter, “AIA”)11 affords to patent
challengers various new mechanisms for challenging patent validity.12 The challenges
are adjudicated by the specially created Patent and Trial Appeal Board (hereinafter,
“PTAB”).13 A goal of the AIA is to weed out weak patents from the system and reduce
the litigation burden on district courts. 14 This comment focuses on whether, and under
what circumstances, a successful patent challenge under the Article I setting may
trigger a first filer’s 180-day exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The comment’s Background section sets forth the relevant aspects of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, the America Invents Act, principles of collateral estoppel, and the
trending PTAB action. The Analysis section develops both the case for and against
allowing PTAB litigation to activate the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 180-day exclusivity
scheme. Lastly, the Proposal section makes a pitch for allowing PTAB litigation to
activate the exclusivity scheme to further the socio-economic policy behind the
Hatch-Waxman Act.
II. BACKGROUND
This comment identifies an interesting, unexplored intersection between the
Hatch-Waxman Act and the AIA. Before the intersection is analyzed in depth, a
detailed understanding of both pieces of enterprising legislation is warranted. The
Hatch-Waxman Act sets forth an elaborate roadmap for generic drug approval-related
patent litigation; whereas, the AIA provides efficient mechanisms for adjudication of
patent validity at the PTAB. The former is effectuated via Article III courts and the
latter through an Article I agency. So, it is also useful to examine the pertinent

See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D) (2012).
Id. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) (triggering – per a final court decision about the patent challenge
- a 75-day clock period within which the first filer must go to market or lose its 180-day exclusivity).
11 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in
35 U.S.C.).
12 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 321-29 (2012) (post grant review); id. §§ 311-19 (2012) (inter partes
review).
13 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 6, 141 (2012); see also Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the
America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 539, 541 (2012).
14 See Mark Consilvio & Jonathan R.K. Stroud, Unraveling the USPTO’s Tangled Web: An
Empirical Analysis of the Complex World of Post-Issuance Patent Proceedings, 5821 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 33, 43-44 (2013); The White House, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling the
Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create
Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signsamerica-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim.
9

10
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principles of collateral estoppel. Lastly, highlighting the current trend of settlement of
the relevant PTAB action will set the stage for the analysis.
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic drug manufacturer typically files an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (hereinafter, “ANDA”) with a paragraph-IV
certification.15 The paragraph-IV certification is a challenge to one or more listed
patents pertaining to the branded drug.16 The certification sets the ball rolling on the
patent challenge under the litigation-related provisions the Act.17
Egged on by a paragraph-IV certification, when a brand company brings
infringement suit, there is a thirty-month stay on approval of the respective ANDA
(hereinafter, “30-month stay”).18 The 30-month stay can end prematurely if a district
court enters judgment in the generic company’s favor, 19 unless a first filer’s 180-day
exclusivity is blocking the second filer’s final approval. 20
As an incentive to the first filer who races to the Food and Drug Administration
(hereinafter, “FDA”), the Hatch-Waxman Act affords to the filer a 180-day exclusivity
during which no other subsequently filed paragraph-IV ANDA may be approved.21 But
while the Act provides the economic incentive, the Act provides for its forfeiture too.22
The Act’s forfeiture by failure-to-market provision, in particular, is quite formulaic.23
The formulaic provision sets forth in a timing-driven schematic the trigger events
that could lead to forfeiture of the first filer’s 180-day exclusivity.24 One of the trigger

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
See id. (providing for a certification “that [a] patent [covering the brand drug] is invalid or will
not be infringed by the [ANDA] product.”); see also Shashank Upadhye, There's A Hole in My Bucket
Dear Liza, Dear Liza: The 30-Year Anniversary of the Hatch-Waxman Act: Resolved and Unresolved
Gaps and Court-Driven Policy Gap Filling, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1307, 1313-14 (2014) ((“When
the brand company's new drug application (NDA) is approved, the brand company is obligated to list
certain patents in [what is commonly known as] the Orange Book.”))
17 Upadhye, supra note 16, at 1316-17 ((“Once the ANDA containing a Paragraph IV certification
is filed, the generic drug company then will send a so-called Paragraph IV notice letter to the brand
company informing it that the generic company has filed an ANDA against the brand drug version
and explaining in great detail the basis why the patent certified against is not an obstacle to final
approval. That is, the notice letter will explain the bases for non-infringement and/or invalidity of the
patent. Upon receipt of the notice letter, the brand company can evaluate the allegations contained
therein and may choose to sue the generic company.”)
18 Upadhye, supra note 16, at 1316-17.
19 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)-(IV) (2012).
20 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
21 Id.; Upadhye, supra note 16, at 1318-19 (explaining using an apt hypothetical why “the
economics of the 180-day exclusivity makes a good deal of sense”).
22 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D) (2012).
23 See id. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
24 Id. The forfeiture-due-to-failure-to-market provision stipulates that the first filer forfeits its
180-day exclusivity when the filer fails to launch upon the occurrence of event (aa) or event (bb),
whichever occurs later. Two types of events fall under the (aa) umbrella:
(AA), which is 75 days after ANDA approval, and
(BB), which is 30 months from the date of ANDA submission.
15
16
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events of interest is patent delisting.25 A first filer may forfeit its 180-day exclusivity
if the patent information in the Orange Book is “withdrawn by the [NDA] holder”
(hereinafter, “delisting trigger”).26 In Teva’s Hatch-Waxman case pertaining to
Merck’s anti-hypertension drugs Cozaar and Hyzaar, Merck voluntarily withdrew its
Orange Book patent, and the FDA, going by the plain text of the delisting provision,
determined that Teva forfeited its exclusivity.27 The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals reversed, reasoning that the FDA’s interpretation was inconsistent with the
structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act, particularly its 180-day exclusivity provision. 28
Thus, a brand company cannot voluntarily delist an exclusivity-conferring Orange
Book-listed patent.29
A second trigger event of interest is a final, favorable court decision as to each
patent against which an ANDA filer has made a paragraph-IV certification
(hereinafter, “court decision trigger”).30 Accordingly, a second filer may attempt to win
its patent litigation and cause the first filer to forfeit its exclusivity using the court
decision trigger.31 In fact, Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., tried to do so through its
declaratory judgment suit in relation to its ANDA for the drug Aricept®. 32 In the
Aricept case, the brand company tried to get rid of Teva’s declaratory suit by providing
to Teva covenants not to sue on two Orange Book-listed patents and by submitting
statutory disclaimers for the other two listed patents.33 But the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit held that Teva’s suit must go forward because, as long as the
patents continue to be listed in the Orange Book, final approval of Teva’s ANDA will
Either (AA) or (BB) suffices to constitute (aa); both are not required. But neither (AA) nor (BB)
can trigger forfeiture as long (bb) can still occur. This is because of the “later of” prong separating (aa)
and (bb).
Three types of events fall under the (bb) umbrella:
(AA), which is a final, non-appealable decision as to the patent;
(BB), which is settlement of the case a court enters judgment including a finding that the patent
is deemed invalid or not infringed; and
(CC), which is delisting of the patent from the Orange Book by the brand company.
Further, each event under (bb) must meet two requirements. First, 75 days must pass from the
occurrence of (AA), (BB), or (CC) to become a (bb) event. Second, to become a (bb) event, each of (AA),
(BB), and (CC) must occur with respect to each patent in the suit.
Any one of (AA), (BB), and (CC) suffices to amount to (bb); all three are not required. Again, the
occurrence of any event under (bb) would not trigger forfeiture as long as an event under (aa) can
potentially occur. This is because of the “later of” predicate between (aa) and (bb).
25 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(CC) (2012).
26 Id.; see generally Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, available at www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm
(last updated May 17, 2013).
27 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1304-08 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
28 Id. at 1316-18 (“We see nothing in the . . . structure of the statute such that brand companies
should be newly able to delist challenged patents, thereby triggering a forfeiture event that deprives
generic companies of the period of marketing exclusivity they otherwise deserve.” (emphasis added)).
29 Id. at 1317-18.
30 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) (2012).
31 Id.
32 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. EISAI Co., 620 F.3d 1341, 1342-1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Teva was
the second filer in this case. Eisai filed an infringement suit against Teva only with respect to one of
the five Orange Book-listed patents. So Teva sought declaratory judgment of non-infringement of the
other four patents.
33 Id. at 1346-48 (relying on Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278,
1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).

[14:453 2015] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

458

remain blocked by the first filer’s 180-day exclusivity.34 Exclusion of a generic from
the market is a cognizable injury-in-fact, and such an “FDA-approval-blocking injury”
creates an “actual controversy.”35
Thus, generally speaking, brand companies’ unilateral actions such as statutory
disclaimers, covenants not to sue, and patent delisting cannot cause exclusivity
forfeiture; by contrast, litigation involving adverse parties has the potential to cause
forfeiture.36 Sitting somewhere in the middle of this spectrum are the litigation-type
patent validity challenge mechanisms recently created under the America Invents Act.
B. The America Invents Act
The AIA aims to overhaul the patent system by, among other things, weeding out
weak patents.37 To that end, the Act affords post-issuance adversarial mechanisms
that a patent challenger may initiate at the PTO. 38 This comment will focus on the
inter partes review (hereinafter, “IPR”) mechanism.39
An IPR can be used to mount invalidity challenges against any patent after nine
months of the patent’s issuance.40 Anyone not a patent owner may petition for an

Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. EISAI Co., 620 F.3d 1341, 1346-48 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. Teva’s case never actually went forward. The case was dismissed as moot and the judgment
was vacated because when Eisai’s writ of certiorari was pending at the Supreme Court, the first filer
commercially launched its ANDA product triggering its own 180-day exclusivity period. See Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. ex rel. Gate Pharm. Div. v. EISAI Co., 426 F. App'x 904 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
36 See also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (allowing a generic company to assert a counterclaim
seeking an order requiring the holder to correct or delete the patent information submitted by the
holder . . . on the ground that the patent does not claim either the drug for which the application was
approved or an approved method of using the drug”). While a brand company’s act of voluntarily
delisting a patent would be unilateral in nature, a deletion of the patent pursuant to this counterclaim
certainly has an adversarial flavor.
37 Consilvio & Stroud, supra note 14.
38 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-19 (2012) (inter partes review); id. §§ 321-29 (post grant review); Pub. L.
112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011); Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings,
Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77
Fed. Reg. 48680 (Aug. 14, 2012) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
39 Generic pharmaceutical companies are likely to take advantage of the IPR mechanism of the
AIA more frequently than the post-grant review (hereinafter, “PGR”) and covered business method
patent review (hereinafter, “CBM”) mechanisms. PGR can be used to challenge any granted patent
but only within nine months of the patent’s issuance. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(c) (2012). This timing
restriction may cause generic companies to invalidate some Orange Book patents too early in the
game, preventing the later filing of a paragraph-IV certification to secure 180-day exclusivity.
Concededly, later-listed patents can certainly be challenged through a PGR. See Accord Healthcare,
Inc. v. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. et. al., PGR2014-00010, Paper 1 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2014) (requesting
post-grant review of a patent listed in the Orange Book for the drug Aloxi®, where the patent issued
after the drug’s NDA was approved). But this comment’s author wishes to restrict the discussion to
IPRs for the sake of simplicity and convenience. Also, covered business method patent review is for
financial products or services-related patents. And very few patents in the pharmaceutical area are
related to financial products or services.
40 See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012); see also id. § 311(b) (limiting the challenge to “a ground that could
be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed
publications”).
34
35
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IPR.41 The petition must be filed within one year of any complaint alleging patent
infringement.42
IPR proceedings are adjudicative, not merely examinational. 43 A provision
indicative of the adversarial nature of the proceeding is that the patent owner may
respond to the petition with “reasons why no inter partes review should be
instituted.”44 The standard for instituting the review, however, is low.45 After an IPR
is instituted, the patent owner may move to cancel any challenged patent claim. 46 A
patent owner may also propose substitute claims. 47
Fact discovery is allowed, but it is quite limited. 48 Where IPR proceedings depart
significantly from district court litigation is the former’s lower burden of proof for claim
cancellation.49
As to timing, IPR proceedings call for an accelerated timeline. The decision to
institute a proceeding must be made within six months of the filing of a petition.50 And
within one year of institution, a final written decision must be made. 51 Therefore, a
petitioner is guaranteed a decision on the merits no later than 1.5 years from the filing
of the petition. A dissatisfied party has a right to appeal.52
Thus, IPR proceedings retain district court litigation’s adversarial flavor but shed
its procedurally laborious aspects. In other words, efficiency is the hallmark. 53 The
efficiency effectively spills over into any corresponding parallel district court litigation
in at least three ways.54
First, cancellation of a patent claim generally extinguishes any cause of action
that may arise out of or be pending under the patent claim. 55 In Fresenius, for example,
the Federal Circuit held that cancellation of certain patent claims after ex parte

See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.101 (2013).
See 37 C.F.R. § 42.101(b) (2013).
43 See Abbott Labs. v. Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasizing – based in
part on legislative history of the AIA – this distinction between inter partes review and inter partes
reexamination when presented with the question of whether parties may take depositions during inter
partes reexaminations).
44 See 35 U.S.C. § 313 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a) (2013).
45 See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (2013) (providing that as long as the petition
raises a “reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
claims,” review will be instituted).
46 See 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 (2013).
47 See 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (2012).
48 Id. § 316(a)(5) (limiting discovery to “deposition of witnesses submitting affidavits or
declarations” and “what is otherwise necessary in the interest of justice”).
49 Id. § 316(e) (requiring that unpatentability be proved by a preponderance of evidence as
opposed to proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, which is a higher burden of proof
required in district court litigation).
50 See id. § 314(b).
51 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) (2013).
52 See 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012).
53 See Consilvio & Stroud, supra note 14, at 43-44.
54 A fourth mechanism by which efficiency may spill over is AIA’s provision pertaining to stay of
parallel district court litigation, see 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2), but that aspect is not pertinent to the
analysis of the issue addressed by this comment.
55 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 2295 (U.S. 2014).
41
42
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reexamination mooted the co-pending district court litigation because the district
court’s judgment had not yet reached finality. 56
Second, a petitioner may not assert in a civil action the same grounds of invalidity
that the petitioner “raised or reasonably could have raised” during the IPR.57 The
statutory estoppel is broader than common law collateral estoppel because of it’s
“reasonably could have raised” language. 58 Thus, the line of invalidity attack used in
an IPR is not available in district court litigation once a final written decision issues
in the IPR.
Third, certain timing restrictions are imposed on the institution of IPRs, which
further contribute to the efficiency spillover.59 For example, if IPR was available at
the time the Fresenius case was litigated, Fresenius could not have used IPR in the
same way as ex parte reexamination due to the timing restrictions.60
Thus, claim cancellation at the PTO moots an Article III case or controversy,61
reducing a court’s litigation backlog; but to take advantage of the efficiency
mechanism, an IPR challenge must be brought efficiently.
Efficiency gains
notwithstanding, application of estoppel as here must conform to common law
principles of collateral estoppel.

56 Id. at 1341-42. In Fresenius, the district court found invalid certain claims of Baxter’s
hemodialysis machine patents. Id. at 1332-33. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the claims
were not invalid. Id. at 1333. The Court then remanded on the issues of damages calculations and
injunctive relief. Id. Meanwhile, the PTO cancelled the remaining asserted claims during ex parte
reexamination, a decision that the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences subsequently affirmed.
Id. at 1334-35. Baxter appealed the BPAI decision, but the Federal Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1335.
Baxter next appealed to the Federal Circuit arguing that the district court’s judgment was final
and therefore it must be given preclusive effect. Id. at 1340. But the Federal Circuit held that the
district court’s judgment was not “sufficiently final” to have preclusive effect because “several aspects
of the district court’s original judgment [were left] unresolved.” Id. at 1341.
57 See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2). The legislative purpose behind the statutory estoppel provision is to
prevent harassment of patent owners by repeated challenges. See Robert L. Stoll, Maintaining
Post-Grant Review Estoppel in the America Invents Act: A Call for Legislative Restraint, 2012
PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 1, 5-11 (2012).
58 See Monica Grewal & Richard Crudo, Estoppel as Applied to and from Patent Office Post-Grant
Proceedings, 88 PTCJ 1020 (Issue No. 2175, Aug. 15, 2014).
59 See 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) (2012) (barring institution of an IPR if petitioner has already filed a
“civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent”); Id. § 315(a)(3) (further setting forth in
the subsection that “[a] counterclaim challenging the validity of a claim of a patent does not constitute
a civil action challenging the validity of a claim”); Id. § 315(d) (barring institution of an IPR “more
than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner . . . is served with a complaint alleging
infringement”).
60 See id. § 315(a)(1). In Fresenius, Fresenius had initiated ex parte reexamination of the Baxter
patent in 2005, which was after the start in 2003 of its suit seeking declaratory judgment of
non-infringement and invalidity of the Baxter patents. 721 F.3d at 1332-34.
61 In ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 760 F.3d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the Federal
Circuit again set aside a district court’s award of injunction and civil contempt remedies, which was
pending appeal, after the PTO cancelled in ex parte reexamination the claims asserted in the district
court.
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C. General Principles of Collateral Estoppel
A court may apply collateral estoppel based on an administrative agency’s
decision if the agency, acting in judicial capacity, properly resolves the issues before it,
which the parties had sufficient opportunity to litigate.62 Collateral estoppel is
generally a procedural issue and is therefore governed by the law of the regional
circuit.63 Under the Federal Circuit, the following four requirements must be met for
application of collateral estoppel: (i) the issues in the two proceedings must be
identical; (ii) the issue in the first proceeding must have been actually litigated; (iii)
the resolution of the issue in the first proceeding must have been necessary for a final
adjudication of the dispute; and (iv) the party against whom estoppel is asserted must
have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first proceeding. 64
Given the similarities and differences in the procedural nuts and bolts of IPR and
district court litigation, the fourth element concerning full and fair opportunity to
litigate will be the most important. This element stems from the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 65 To meet the
constitutional standard, courts have considered the following procedural nuances of
agency proceedings to determine collateral estoppel effect on an Article III court:
opportunity to cross-examine the adverse party’s witnesses; 66 availability of a record
adequately supporting the findings;67 right to judicial review;68 similarity of burden of
proof;69 extent of representation of the party sought to be precluded;70 scope of pre-trial
discovery afforded;71 and existence of evidentiary opportunities or restrictions. 72
At the intersection of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the AIA lies the question of
whether a paragraph-IV ANDA applicant can seek a determination recognizing a final,
favorable IPR decision as a forfeiture trigger event. The recent IPR settlement trend
is indicative of the uncertainty of the answer.

62 United States v. Utah Const. & Min. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966); see also Astoria Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991) ((“[w]e have long favored application of the
common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to those
determinations of administrative bodies that have attained finality.”)).
63 See Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
64 See generally Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 260 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001); 89 Am. Jur.
Proof of Facts 3d 1 (Originally published in 2006) (compiling cases pertaining to each of the four
elements of collateral estoppel as applied between district courts in patent infringement actions).
65 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82(1982).
66 See Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
67 See Moore v. Chater, 97 F.3d 1460 (9th Cir. 1996).
68 United States v. Utah Const. & Min. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966).
69 City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 734 F.2d 1157, 1165-66 (6th Cir. 1984).
70 Thomas v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 794 F.2d 661, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
71 Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 820 F.2d 892, 895-97 (7th Cir. 1987).
72 United States v. Karlen, 645 F.2d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 1981).
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D. Orange Book Patent IPR Settlement Trend
The generic drug industry has responded relatively slowly to the introduction of
the post-grant review processes under AIA. 73 But two trends seem to be emerging.
One, IPR seems to be mainly a second filer’s game.74 And two, these IPR challenges
tend to settle.75
For example, Ranbaxy initiated an IPR challenge against a patent listed in the
Orange Book for the anti-HIV drug Lexiva®.76 Here, because there was no co-pending
lawsuit, Ranbaxy had either not filed a paragraph-IV ANDA application or was not
sued.77 Rather, another generic company, Mylan, had already filed an ANDA and was
litigating against the same patent in district court. 78 Anyway, the PTAB instituted

73 See Christopher R. Noyes et al., When Inter Partes Review Meets Hatch-Waxman Patents,
Law360, Sept. 9, 2014 (reporting that, of a total of 1,562 IPR petitions filed through July 2014, only
32 petitions were against Orange Book-listed patents and that of those 32, three petitions were filed
in 2012, seven were filed in 2013, and 22 have been filed this year through July 2014).
74 See id. (“Only one IPR petition has been filed by the first ANDA filer to be sued for infringement
in related Hatch-Waxman litigation. Twenty-one petitions have been filed by subsequent ANDA
defendants; and 10 have been filed by petitioners that were not — as of the date of filing the petition
— defendants in related Hatch-Waxman litigation. These petitioners may be prospective ANDA filers,
ANDA filers that have not yet been sued for patent infringement, or interested third parties.”).
Similarly situated to Teva in the Aricept case, these second filers are likely interested in creating a
forfeiture trigger event based on a favorable IPR decision. See Teva Pharm. supra note 32.
75 IPRs against three Orange Book-listed patents have reached a final written decision. See
Amneal Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Supernus Pharmaceuticals, Inc., IPR2013-00368, Paper No. 94
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2014) (Oracea®); Amneal Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Supernus Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
IPR2013-00371, Paper No. 96 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2014) (Oracea®); Amneal Pharmaceuticals, LLC v.
Supernus Pharmaceuticals, Inc., IPR2013-00372, Paper No. 92 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2014) (Oracea®). By
contrast, IPRs against eight Orange Book-listed patents have been settled so far. See Apotex Inc. v.
Alcon Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. IPR2013-00012, Paper No. 73 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 15, 2013) (Vigamox®);
Apotex Inc. v. Alcon Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. IPR2013-00015, Paper No. 61 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 15, 2013)
(Vigamox®); Ranbaxy Laboratories, Ltd. et al. v. Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., IPR2013-00024, Paper
No. 71 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 15, 2013) (Lexiva®); Apotex Corp. v. Alcon Research, Ltd, IPR2013-00428, Paper
No. 60 (P.T.A.B July 21, 2014) (Travatan Z®); Apotex Corp. v. Alcon Research, Ltd, IPR2013-00429,
Paper No. 58 (P.T.A.B July 21, 2014) (Travatan Z®); Apotex Corp. v. Alcon Research, Ltd, IPR201300430, Paper No. 58 (P.T.A.B July 21, 2014) (Travatan Z®); Impax Laboratories, Inc. v. Meda
Pharmaceuticals Inc., IPR2014-00731, Paper No. 12 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 4, 2014) (Astepro®); Pack
Pharmaceuticals v. Alza Corporation, IPR2014-00868, Paper No. 10 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 8, 2014) (Glucotrol
XL); see generally Anna J. Smith, Inter Partes Review -- Parties Favor Settlement Over Board
Decisions, Foley & Lardner LLP, http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2014/09/25/inter-partes-reviewparties-favor-settlement-over-board-decisions/ (Sept. 25, 2014) (observing that parties “choos[e]
certainty” by settling their IPRs).
76 See Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. et al. v. Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., IPR2013-00024, Paper
No. 1 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 18, 2012).
77 See Charles H. Chevalier, A Rare Inter Partes Review for an Orange Book Listed Patent,
Gibbons P.C., http://www.iplawalert.com/2013/12/articles/patent/a-rare-inter-partes-review-for-anorange-book-listed-patent/ (Dec. 3, 2013) (discussing the possibility that either “Ranbaxy did not file
a paragraph IV certification or Vertex chose not to file suit” in the context of Lexiva® patents).
78 See ViiV Healthcare Co. et al. v. Mylan Inc. et al., No. 12-1065-RGA (D. Del.) (filed Aug. 22,
2012).
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Ranbaxy’s IPR,79 and six months later, Ranbaxy settled the IPR “and any potential
Hatch-Waxman litigation on th[e] patent.”80
Some industry observers view brand-generic settlements as thwarting the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s goal of earlier generic drug commercialization. 81 The IPR
settlement trend is likely due to the uncertainty about the legal question of how, if at
all, an IPR decision would impact a first filer’s 180-day exclusivity.
III. ANALYSIS
A question of first impression is whether a paragraph-IV ANDA applicant can
seek a determination recognizing a favorable IPR decision, affirmed on appeal,82 as an
event triggering forfeiture of a first filer’s 180-day exclusivity.83 For example, let us
assume that in the IPR case discussed in the previous sub-section, Ranbaxy had filed
its own paragraph-IV ANDA for generic Lexiva while its IPR challenge was pending.
The filing would most likely have triggered a lawsuit for Ranbaxy.84 Further assume
that Mylan was the first filer and had maintained its 180-day exclusivity.85 While both

79 See Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. et al v. Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., IPR2013-00024, Paper
No. 16 (P.T.A.B. March 5, 2013).
80 See Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. et al v. Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., IPR2013-00024, Paper
No. 69 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 31, 2013). Subsequently, Mylan also settled its district court litigation against
the patent. See Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice at 120, ViiV Healthcare Co. et al. v. Mylan Inc.
et al., No. 12-1065-RGA (D. Del. dismissed July 2, 2014).
81 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions
8 (2010) (approximating the annual cost to consumers at $ 3.5 billion due to delayed generic entry
that, in turn, results from a type of settlement between brand and generic companies); see also C.
Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 949 (2011) (“Society doesn't benefit from a private deal
to drop a challenge that has the effect of limiting competition.”); see generally Megan M. La Belle,
Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375, 397-410 (2014) (arguing that
patent litigation settlements are against public interest). Interestingly, a University of Washington
professor-founded Initiative for Responsibility in Drug Pricing LLC piggybacked on a generic
company’s IPR challenge against a patent relating the drug Tygacil® – hoping to take the challenge
forward in the event the brand and the generic settle. See Initiative for Responsibility in Drug Pricing
LLC v. Wyeth LLC, IPR2014-01259, Paper No. 1 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 8, 2014). The petition, however, was
denied. Id. at Paper No. 8 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2015).
82 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) (2012) ((“a court enters a final decision from which no
appeal (other than a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken
that the patent is invalid or not infringed”)); 35 U.S.C. § 319 (granting any party to the IPR proceeding
the right to appeal the final written decision of the PTAB to the Federal Circuit); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1) (2012) (granting to the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of district court
decisions in patent cases).
83 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb); supra text accompanying note 24; see also H. Keeto
Sabharwal et al., How Inter Partes Review Impacts Hatch-Waxman Exclusivity, Law360, Feb. 27, 2013
(reflecting upon the legal uncertainty as to “whether, and to what extent, a successful IPR challenge
by a subsequent [ANDA] filer may impact the ‘failure to market’ trigger for forfeiture of 180-day
Hatch-Waxman exclusivity held by a first-to-file ANDA applicant”).
84 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012); Upadhye, supra note 16, at 1316-17.
85 This is a fair assumption given that Mylan was in its paragraph-IV litigation much before
Ranbaxy initiated its IPR. Moreover, Ranbaxy’s IPR settlement contemplates “potential
Hatch-Waxman litigation” on the patent, which indicates that Ranbaxy may have had a plan to
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Ranbaxy and Mylan had their district court cases pending, Ranbaxy may have received
a favorable IPR decision. After winning on appeal, Ranbaxy would certainly have been
interested in seeking a determination recognizing the final IPR decision as an event
triggering Mylan’s exclusivity forfeiture.86
Two forfeiture trigger events are implicated by a favorable, final decision from an
IPR proceeding.87 The first one is the court decision trigger.88 And the second event is
the delisting trigger.89 As with most legal questions, there is a case for and there is a
case against.
A. The Case Against Pulling the Trigger
The first question is whether a paragraph-IV ANDA filer can seek a determination
recognizing a final, favorable IPR decision as a court decision trigger. Brand
companies (and possibly, first filers as well) will proffer several reasons why the court
decision trigger should not apply.
First, textualist and other interpretive considerations preclude such a decision.
The Hatch-Waxman Act expressly provides for the trigger when a court enters a final
decision in “an infringement action” pertaining to the patent.90 By contrast, the
30-month stay provision in the same statute contemplates that a district court decision
“including any substantive determination that there is no cause of action for patent
infringement or invalidity” may terminate the 30-month stay.91 By implication,
therefore, the absence of such language in the court decision trigger provision is a
strong indication that, for a first filer to lose its prize, Congress intended to set a high
bar.
The high congressional bar operates (or should operate) in the form of a higher
burden of proof for invalidity in district court litigation, thereby stemming any
preclusive effect of an IPR decision.92 A patent is presumed valid, and the presumption
can be overthrown only by clear and convincing evidence of invalidity. 93 The higher
burden of proof is a procedural advantage for a brand company in a Hatch-Waxman
infringement action. Absence of this advantage in an IPR proceeding should preclude
paragraph-IV challenge the patent in the future. See Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. et al v. Vertex
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., IPR2013-00024, Paper No. 69 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 31, 2013).
86 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2012).
87 Id.
88 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) (2012); supra text accompanying note 24.
89 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(CC); supra text accompanying note 24.
90 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) (2012).
91 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).
92 Cf. Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Congress limited
the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect to be given the decisions of the TTAB because the Lanham
Act provides for extensive judicial involvement in the registration and protection of trademarks. . . .
[T]he ability of courts to hear appeals on a de novo basis reflects a Congressional intent not to invoke
the immunizing doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel with regard to TTAB proceedings. In
this Circuit, a court hearing an infringement claim is not legally and conclusively bound by a prior
decision of the TTAB regarding the same trademark dispute.”).
93 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2246 (2011) (reasoning to the conclusion
that absent an express burden of proof requirement in the Patent Act, common law principles govern,
and under common law, a presumption of validity can be overcome only by clear and convincing
evidence).
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collateral application of an affirmed IPR decision. 94 Matter-of-factly, in trademark
infringement actions, district courts often deny collateral application of decisions made
by the Trademark Trial and Appellate Board (hereinafter, “TTAB”). 95
The high congressional bar effectuates an important policy. An Orange Book
patent – when it confers 180-day exclusivity to a first filer – is crucial to the incentive
regime of the Hatch-Waxman Act.96 Incentivized by the 180-day exclusivity, first filers
act as trailblazers in Hatch-Waxman patent litigation. But if second filers can easily
tinker with the incentive for their own benefit, it will frustrate the first filer’s endgame.
Thus, recognizing an affirmed IPR decision as a forfeiture trigger under either trigger
provision would impair the important policy objective of safeguarding the first filer’s
exclusivity.
Similar considerations apply to the second question of whether an ANDA filer in
district court litigation can move to compel an NDA holder to delist a patent based on
a final, favorable IPR decision. A generic company may consider using the
Hatch-Waxman statute’s delisting counterclaim to trigger forfeiture.97 But, textualist
and other interpretive considerations again compel a negative conclusion.
An ANDA filer can assert the delisting counterclaim only in response to an
“infringement action.”98 Read in context, the counterclaim provision’s very next
sub-section underscores that such a counterclaim cannot be the basis for an
94 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (advising against preclusion when “the
adversary has a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action”); see also 18 Wright,
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4422 (2d ed. 2002)) (explaining in the context of
a civil proceeding followed by a criminal proceeding that “a party who has carried the burden of
establishing an issue by a preponderance of the evidence is not entitled to assert preclusion in a later
action that requires proof of the same issue by a higher standard”); cf. State of N.C. v. Charles Pfizer
& Co., 537 F.2d 67, 74 (4th Cir. 1976) (denying collateral estoppel based on a Federal Trade
Commission finding in antitrust litigation in district court because “[t]he Commission did not require
that the alleged fraud on the Patent Office be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence and
employed evidentiary and procedural rules much more lenient than those incident to a judicial trial”
(emphasis added)).
95 See Way, 757 F.2d at 1186 (affirming district court’s refusal to collaterally apply TTAB’s
determination of likelihood of confusion to the district court’s infringement inquiry mainly because
evidence of actual confusion was not considered in the former but important for the latter); accord
Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass'n of Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 38, 41-43 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing district court’s
grant of collateral estoppel because “the standards governing ‘likelihood of confusion’ in registration
cancellation or opposition proceedings before the TTAB and Federal Circuit can be different than the
‘likelihood of confusion’ standard applicable in trademark infringement actions in a district court”);
Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Beamish & Crawford Ltd., 937 F.2d 729, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
collateral estoppel was incorrectly applied because the TTAB’s decision of no likelihood of confusion
even when the Federal Circuit had affirmed the agency’s decision).
96 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1316-18 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Ohly & Patel,
supra note 4, at 117-18; Korn, supra note 8, at 335; Upadhye, supra note 16, at 1318-19.
97 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2012). Note that under a plain reading of the delisting trigger
provision, only an NDA holder can voluntarily withdraw an Orange Book-listed patent. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(CC) (2012) (providing for forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity seventy-five days
after “[t]he patent . . . is withdrawn by the holder of the application approved under subsection (b) of
this section” (emphasis added)). That ability of the NDA holder, however, is circumscribed if the patent
is a 180-day exclusivity-conferring patent. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303,
1316-18 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Also note that the suggestion about an ANDA filer invoking the counterclaim
provision presupposes the existence of a patent infringement action, which is a prerequisite to the
assertion of the counterclaim. See id. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(II).
98 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2012).
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independent cause of action.99 So, Congress could have contemplated only district
court litigation as the ANDA filer’s avenue here.100 Congress could not have intended
an IPR proceeding to be subsumed within the counterclaim provision, which was
introduced in the Hatch-Waxman Act about eight years before the AIA was signed into
law in 2011.101
Moreover, the counterclaim provision is a generic company’s countermeasure
against erroneous or frivolous patent listings.102 So, absent erroneous or frivolous
conduct on the brand company’s part, the company should not be compelled to delist
its patents.
Pragmatic concerns also militate against applying the delisting trigger. Listing
relevant patents in the Orange Book is an affirmative obligation for a brand
company.103 The listing serves as a notice to ANDA filers who, in turn, have the
obligation to provide one of four patent-specific certifications in the ANDA.104 But an
IPR petitioner may challenge, and the PTAB may cancel, only some of the claims in an
IPR proceeding.105 The brand company, the FDA, or even a court cannot prophesize if
the remaining claims will be relevant against future ANDA filers. As a practical
See id. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(II).
See Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (explaining the general rule that “an administrative agency decision, issued pursuant to a
statute, cannot have preclusive effect when Congress, either expressly or impliedly, indicated that it
intended otherwise,” citing Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110 (1991)).
101 See Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat.2066 (2003) (introducing amendments to the
Hatch-Waxman Act, including the counterclaim provision); Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(bringing into effect the America Invents Act).
102 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2012) (enabling an ANDA applicant to “assert a counterclaim
seeking an order requiring the [NDA] holder to correct or delete the patent information submitted by
the holder” (emphasis added)); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1687
(2012) (holding that by providing for the counterclaim, Congress addressed “a broader problem—that
generic companies generally had no avenue to challenge the accuracy of brands' patent listings, and
that the FDA therefore could not approve proper applications to bring inexpensive drugs to market.”).
In Caraco, a generic company certified to the FDA through its product’s label that the company did
not seek to market only for one use that was patented. Id. at 1679. In response to the generic
company’s carved-out label, the brand company broadened its Orange Book use code description
(brand companies are required to provide to the FDA a method of use description pertaining to any
listed method patent). See id. The broadened use code signaled to the FDA that the generic company’s
product was within the patent scope, which, in turn, prevented the FDA from approving the generic
product. Id. Eventually, the Court held that the Act’s counterclaim provision was the appropriate tool
to counter such brand company shenanigans. See id. at 1687.
103 See Upadhye, supra note 16, at 1338 (“Section 355(b)(1)(G) creates the affirmative obligation
to list into the Orange Book the patents that can be implicated by the approval of an ANDA or §
505(b)(2) application. Once patents are listed in the Orange Book, the FDA cannot approve any ANDA
or § 505(b)(2) application until all listed patents have been certified against using one or more of the
relevant patent certifications. Because the ANDA sponsor must certify to one or more patents, it is
only when the sponsor notifies the brand company through the Paragraph IV notice letter that the
brand company even becomes aware of the generic drug application. If an ANDA sponsor certifies
under either Paragraphs I, II, or III, it is not required to notify the brand company at all.”).
104 See id.
105 See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012) (“[a] petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as
unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics v. Isis
Innovation Limited, IPR2012-00022, Paper 166, at 56 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2014) (cancelling claims 1, 2,
4, 5, 8, 19, 20, 24, and 25 but upholding claims 3, 12, 13, 15, 18, 21, and 22 against the petitioner’s
IPR challenge).
99

100
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matter, therefore, delisting the entire patent when only some of its claims have been
cancelled may not be a viable option.
All of the above may be compelling reasons to maintain the Hatch-Waxman status
quo despite the AIA. But the flipside cannot be ignored. Second filers also have
legitimate stake in the game.
B. The Case For Pulling the Trigger
Second filers will countercharge with several arguments as to why a final,
favorable IPR decision should collaterally apply either as a court decision or delisting
trigger. First, the AIA regime calls for a new perspective. And the textualist argument
that Congress envisioned only an infringement action to work its way to exclusivity
forfeiture cannot be harmonized with the AIA.106
As a threshold matter, the Hatch-Waxman Act antedates the AIA; therefore, the
Hatch-Waxman Act is not controlling on the issue of whether Congress intended a
PTAB decision to have a preclusive effect sufficient to trigger exclusivity forfeiture. 107
Next, according to the Supreme Court in Microsoft v. i4i, a patent holder’s procedural
advantage in district court litigation existed by virtue of the common law. 108 But,
tellingly, the AIA’s lower burden of proof requirement for claim cancellation effectively
overrides Microsoft v. i4i.109 The AIA has created litigation-type adversarial
mechanisms and has authorized the PTAB to cancel patent claims. 110
The
authorization effectuates statutory estoppel, replacing common law collateral estoppel,
and the statutory estoppel kicks in whenever the PTAB removes the very basis
underlying a cause of action in infringement.111
106 See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 109 (1991) (explaining that the
value in “harmonizing different statutes . . . prompts the kindred rule that legislative repeals by
implication will not be recognized, insofar as two statutes are capable of coexistence, ‘absent a clearly
expressed congressional intention to the contrary.’” (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551
(1974)).
107 See Univ. of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794-95, (1986) (reasoning that “[a]lthough [28
U.S.C.] § 1738 is a governing statute with regard to the judgments and records of state courts, because
§ 1738 antedates the development of administrative agencies it clearly does not represent a
congressional determination that the decisions of state administrative agencies should not be given
preclusive effect”).
108 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2246 (2011) (holding that absent an
express burden of proof requirement in the Patent Act, common law principles govern, and under
common law, a presumption of validity can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence).
109 See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012) (expressly setting forth that “[i]n an inter partes review . . . . the
petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the
evidence.” (emphasis added)); see also H.R. REP. 112-98, at 48 (2011) (“This new . . . post-grant review
procedure will provide a meaningful opportunity to improve patent quality and restore confidence in
the presumption of validity that comes with issued patents in court.”).
110 See 35 U.S.C. § 318(b) (2012); accord Abbott Labs. v. Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2013). Moreover, the IPR proceeding otherwise provides substantially similar procedural
advantages in an adversarial setting. See supra Background section, subsection B.
111 Cf. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that
the re-examination statute authorizes the PTO to cancel patent claims and that cancellation
extinguishes the basis for a suit); contra Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90
F.3d 1558, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (pointing to direct evidence of congressional intent of disallowing
decisions of the International Trade Commission to have preclusive effect on district courts); State of
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The AIA regime also raises a pragmatic concern and, therefore, an interpretive
revelation. Alarmingly, the IPR statute’s “raised or reasonably could have raised”
estoppel would create a deadlock for second filers.112 Under the estoppel provision,
“the petitioner, may not assert [] in civil action . . . that the claim is invalid on any
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter
partes review” after the PTAB has reached a final written decision on the merits. 113
Therefore, a second filer that succeeds in an IPR will be subsequently prohibited from
using the same invalidity challenge – no matter how strong it is – to trigger forfeiture
via district court litigation. Consequently, the second filer will continue to be stuck
behind the first filer’s 180-day exclusivity.114 Such an absurd result could not have
been intended by Congress.115
Second, as to the delisting trigger, the notice function of listing a patent in the
Orange Book is irrelevant if all the claims of the patent stand cancelled. Concededly,
however, an IPR petitioner may succeed in challenging at the PTAB only those patent
claims that are asserted against the petitioner in district court.116 Under that scenario,
a court may not consider it wise to order delisting the entire patent. That is because
while the counterclaim provision authorizes a court to order the NDA holder to correct
or delete patent information in the Orange Book, the provision does not expressly
authorize a court to do so on a claim-by-claim basis.117 Nonetheless, the court should
order delisting whenever a situation allows. 118 Moreover, even under a narrow reading
of Caraco v. Novo as applicable only to erroneous or frivolous listings, a brand
company’s continued listing of a patent after its claims have been cancelled would still
be erroneous, if not frivolous. 119
The analogy to trademark cases is inapposite because TTAB proceedings are
fundamentally different.120 The TTAB decides in an inter partes proceeding the
registration eligibility of a mark in light of another already registered mark. 121 After
N.C. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 537 F.2d 67, 74 (4th Cir. 1976) (denying collateral estoppel based on a
Federal Trade Commission finding by citing to an express provision of the Federal Trade Commission
Act as inconsistent with the very doctrine of collateral estoppel). Moreover, the Supreme Court
recently noted that “[p]rocedural differences, by themselves . . . do not defeat issue preclusion.” B & B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., No. 13-352, 2015 WL 1291915, at *13 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2015).
112 See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012).
113 Id. (emphasis added).
114 Contra Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. EISAI Co., 620 F.3d 1341, 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(holding that because an exclusivity-conferring Orange Book patent blocks FDA approval, the second
filer has a legitimate cause of action to challenge the patent).
115 Cf. Brief for Petitioner at 33-34, B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2899
(2014) (No. 13-352), 2014 WL 4404693 at *33-34 (arguing in the context of the Lanham Act that if a
district court were to follow one standard of likelihood of confusion to register a trademark and another
standard of likelihood of confusion to determine infringement of a trademark, then the interplay
between the TTAB and a district court would lead to counterintuitive results).
116 See discussion supra Analysis subsection I.
117 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2012).
118 For example, in a particular case, a court may find that the while some other claims remain
unchallenged, the claims pertaining to the approved brand drug are cancelled.
119 See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1687 (2012); supra text
accompanying note 102.
120 Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063-64 (2012) (trademark opposition and cancellation proceedings),
with 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012) (inter partes review proceedings).
121 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063-64 (2012).
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the TTAB decides the eligibility question, the question of infringement of the mark
often comes up in district courts.122 In resolving the infringement question, a district
court may or may not apply the TTAB’s finding of likelihood of confusion because
trademark registration and infringement could be separate inquiries. 123 But the
Supreme Court recently held that a court must give preclusive effect to a TTAB
decision in a case where the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met, thereby
creating a strong presumption in favor of recognizing the agency’s decision as
collaterally applicable.124 Thus, the original trademark – which is not extinguished in
a TTAB proceeding – may form the basis for an infringement action in district court.
By contrast, the PTO’s cancellation of a patent claim extinguishes any cause of action
associated with the patent.125
Lastly, from a policy perspective, not recognizing a final, favorable IPR decision
as a trigger event will deny to second filers the advantages of the efficiency spillover
from PTAB litigation.126 And generic companies would be dissuaded from taking
advantage of the AIA-prompted cleanliness campaign against weak patents and from
considering the PTAB as part of their endgame.127 To say that incentivizing the first
122 See id. § 1141(1) (creating a civil cause of action for trademark infringement); see, e.g., B & B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 385-87 (8th Cir. 2009) (reviewing district court’s
decision in B & B’s infringement action against Hargis after the TTAB denied registration of Hargis’
mark “Sealtite” due to its confusing similarity with B & B’s “Sealtight”). Also, for a review the TTAB’s
decision, a losing party may ask either the Federal Circuit or may file a civil action in a federal district
court. See id. § 1071.
123 See Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1185-86 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that
the TTAB’s finding that the defendant’s purported mark “Freedom Realty Company” was likely to be
confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s already registered marks “Freedom Federal” and “Freedom
Account” did not necessarily apply to the district court’s analysis as to whether “Freedom Realty
Company” infringed the plaintiff’s marks – because the latter required evidence of actual confusion,
which the TTAB did not consider); but see EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 746 F.2d
375, 378-79 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying collateral estoppel based on TTAB’s decision of no likelihood of
confusion between “Super Loader” and “EZ Loader” and other trademarks owned by the plaintiff);
Flavor Corp. of Am. v. Kemin Indus., Inc., 493 F.2d 275, 278, 281 (8th Cir. 1974) (giving collateral
estoppel effect to an agency decision of no likelihood of confusion between plaintiff’s “PESTLUR” and
defendant’s “LURE”); Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 256 (3d Cir.
2006) (affirming district court’s dismissal based on preclusive effect of the TTAB’s decision of no
likelihood of confusion between plaintiff’s “EQ System” and defendant’s “Shades EQ” marks); see also
6 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 32:101 (4th ed.) (“[A]n
inter partes decision of the Trademark Board, whether reviewed by the Federal Circuit or not, must
be carefully examined to determine exactly what was decided and on what evidentiary basis. Many
such oppositions and cancellations are decided only upon a limited comparison of the registered or
applied-for format and goods without regard for their marketplace manner of use. For this reason . . .
such decisions have no later preclusive effect in a suit where actual usage in the marketplace is the
paramount issue.”). Moreover, registration of a trademark does not confer a procedural advantage to
the trademark owner in an infringement action. See DeCosta v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 60607 (1st Cir. 1992) (affirming refusal to relitigate likelihood of confusion simply because the mark was
registered later - based on the rationale that registration of a trademark does not make proving the
trademark’s infringement easier); EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc., 746 F.2d at 379 (deciding that lack
of registration of the trademark did not confer a procedural advantage to an adversary challenging a
mark in an infringement action).
124 See B & B Hardware, 2015 WL 1291915, at *14.
125 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
126 Supra Background section, subsection B.
127 Given the structure of the generic drug industry, IPR might be the right tool for second filers
given the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of IPR proceedings. See, e.g., Brian Murphy et al., A New
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filer is the only goal of the 180-day exclusivity provision is missing the forest for the
trees. The provision also incentivizes second filers to attempt to pull the rug from
under the first filer’s feet.128 The ultimate objective is early commercialization of less
expensive generic drugs for the benefit of American consumers.
IV. PROPOSAL
Having considered both sides of the coin, the final step would be to choose a result
that is fully consistent with the objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The case for
pulling the trigger wins when two things are considered in tandem: (i) the practical
consequences of pulling the trigger; and (ii) the public policy purpose of enhancing
access to affordable healthcare.
First filers are not uninvited to the IPR game, and they may incidentally benefit
from the game even after choosing not to play. So, the practical consequences of an
IPR-based exclusivity trigger are not out of line with the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
incentive regime. And commonsensically (as well as under the public rights doctrine),
a weak patent, which should not have passed the PTO’s muster in the first place,
should not stand in the way of consumer access to generic drugs. Thus, a conformant
amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act would best serve the Act’s policy objectives.
A. Practical Consequences of Pulling the Trigger
The IPR-based exclusivity trigger makes practical sense for several reasons. As
a threshold matter, no generic company or public interest organization will be able to
trigger a first filer’s 180-day exclusivity forfeiture solely based on a favorable IPR
decision. For a court decision trigger, the Hatch-Waxman Act requires district court
litigation.129 To initiate district court litigation, a generic company must file a
paragraph-IV ANDA.130 And the filing of a paragraph-IV ANDA signifies the
likelihood of a generic drug on the market before patent expiration. On the other hand,
a public interest group will likely not have standing for appellate review to obtain a

Weapon In Generic Drug Companies' Arsenal, Law360, Apr. 19, 2013 (explaining why “[f]or generic
competitors that are not first to file an ANDA with a Paragraph IV patent challenge, the strategy is
quite different”).
128 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) (2012); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. EISAI Co., 620 F.3d
1341, 1343-47 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Upadhye, supra note 16, at 1324-25 (explaining why “Congress
legislated to extinguish the 180-day exclusivity”).
129 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) (2012) (setting forth a trigger event when “[i]n an
infringement action brought against that applicant with respect to the patent or in a declaratory
judgment action brought by that applicant with respect to the patent, a court enters a final decision”
(emphasis added)).
130 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012); Upadhye, supra note 16, at 1316-17. Moreover, the
declaratory judgment action provision requires that a paragraph-IV ANDA applicant wait forty-five
days after the NDA holder fails to initiate infringement action based on a paragraph-IV challenge.
See id. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i). So, a generic company that is not sued still cannot seek a court decision trigger
through the IPR route without having an ANDA in the waiting.
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final decision.131 This result is not counterintuitive to the purpose of the HatchWaxman Act.
Next, a generic company in a paragraph IV lawsuit can ask the FDA to recognize
the Federal Circuit’s affirmance of an IPR decision as a forfeiture trigger, and in the
event of a denial, the company can challenge the denial in a federal court. Recognizing
the final, favorable decision as a court decision trigger will be in line with the purpose
of the Hatch-Waxman Act.132 And at the same time, it will not diminish the first filer’s
incentive. Consider the following hypothetical.
A brand drug company (hereinafter, “B”) has listed one patent in the Orange Book
for its pioneer drug. The patent is set to expire in 2020. A first filer (hereinafter, “F1”)
files a paragraph IV ANDA seeking approval of a generic version and is in early stages
of district court litigation. A second filer (hereinafter, “F2) is still preparing to submit
its own ANDA. But, in the meantime, F2 petitions for an IPR of the patent.
Next, F2 files its own paragraph-IV ANDA, and B initiates an infringement action
against F2 in district court. While F1 and F2 are litigating their infringement actions,
the PTAB cancels the asserted claims. Promptly, B appeals the PTAB’s decision to the
Federal Circuit.133 Next, the Federal Circuit affirms the IPR decision, and F2 moves
the court to enter judgment in its favor.134 At this point, F1’s ANDA is either awaiting
approval or is already approved.
Assume F1’s ANDA is still awaiting approval. If the court enters judgment in F2’s
favor and if the FDA recognizes F2’s win as a court decision trigger, it will not lead up
to F1’s exclusivity forfeiture because F1’s ANDA is still awaiting approval. 135
131 See Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1263 (Fed. Cir.
2014), cert. denied, No. 14-516, 2015 WL 731871 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2015). For example, Coalition for
Affordable Drugs (ADROCA) LLC recently filed an IPR challenge against a patent relating to the drug
Ampyra®. See Coalition for Affordable Drugs (ADROCA) LLC v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc.,
IPR2015-00720, Paper No. 1 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2015). Whatever the outcome of this IPR at the PTAB,
the Federal Circuit will likely dismiss any appeal due to lack of Article III standing. See Consumer
Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1263.
132 See discussion supra Analysis subsection B. For the reasons provided in the subsection, a final,
favorable IPR decision should not constitute delisting trigger unless Congress empowers courts to
order delisting on a claim-by-claim basis. For the same reason, a court will not be inclined to deem
the continued listing of a patent as erroneous or frivolous even after claim cancellation by PTAB.
133 See 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012). Because the PTAB’s decision is not final at this stage, the district
court will likely not be inclined to either dismiss the infringement case or recognize it as a court
decision trigger under the Hatch-Waxman Act. See generally Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc.,
721 F.3d 1330, 1340-42 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (discussing the element of finality of a decision that is
necessary to give effect to principles of res judicata), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2295 (U.S. 2014). In the
hypothetical, if B chooses not to appeal the PTAB decision, F2 can most likely seek appellate review
even after having received a favorable decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 319 (providing that “[a]ny party to the
inter partes review shall have the right to be a party to the appeal”); see generally Jean Alexander
Cosmetics, Inc. v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 256 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining based on several
authorities why a party that prevails at the TTAB may still appeal the decision).
134 Here, as a prerequisite, F2 must have received “tentative approval” of its ANDA at this time.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb) (2012).
135 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2012); supra text accompanying note 24. In this hypothetical,
while a (bb) event has occurred, an (aa) event has not. The “later of” predicate between (aa) and (bb)
in the provision implies that if an (aa) event could occur, forfeiture is not triggered until the event
actually occurs. In other words, F2 is still stuck behind F1’s 180-day exclusivity. But there is a caveat.
Here, F1 would be ill-advised to prepare an ANDA application that is so qualitatively deficient that
FDA approval takes more than 30 months from the ANDA’ submission. See id. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(IV)
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Consequently, F1 must market its generic within seventy-five days of receiving ANDA
approval to avoid exclusivity forfeiture. Of course, this result is in conformity with the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s goals.
Alternatively, assume F1’s ANDA has received approval by the time F2 obtains
the entry of a favorable judgment. If the FDA recognizes F2’s win as a court decision
trigger, it will not lead up to F1’s exclusivity forfeiture if F1 goes to market within
seventy-five days.136 Again, forcing a generic to enter the market in this manner is
consistent with the Hatch-Waxman Act’s aspirations.
Similar situations can be contemplated with multiple generic players, a plurality
of patents, and differentially timed events.137 The end result in most, if not all, such
situations will be acceleration of generic drug commercialization in congruity with the
legislative scheme. Thus, pulling the trigger has practical value, and it is consistent
with the overall structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act.138 Pulling the trigger will also
be consistent with the modern-day rise of administrative agencies and their
acknowledged role in resolving matters pertaining to public rights.
B. Patent as a Public Right
An improperly granted patent should not preclude consumer access to cheaper
versions of a drug. This conclusion is supported by the public rights doctrine. Under
the public rights doctrine, controversies involving public rights “may be removed from
Art. III courts and delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies.” 139 A
(setting forth that a first filer’s failure to obtain tentative approval in 30 months from the date of the
ANDA submission will constitute exclusivity forfeiture).
136 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) (2012); supra text accompanying note 24. F1 will
have 75 days from the entry of favorable judgment to prepare for commercialization, but as long as
F1 enters the market within that time-frame, F1 will not forfeit its exclusivity.
137 Where multiple patents are listed for a single branded drug, a favorable, final decision is
required for each patent. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb) (2012) (requiring the court decision
trigger “as to each of the patents” that an ANDA applicant challenges) (emphasis added)). So, a second
filer will not be able to tinker with a first filer’s exclusivity by choosing one weak patent from the list
and winning on an IPR.
138 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1316-18 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (considering
the overall “structure” of the Hatch-Waxman Act instead of placing emphasis on plain text meaning
of the delisting provision in deciding that a brand company cannot voluntarily delist an
exclusivity-conferring patent); see also Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct.
1670, 1687 (looking at the “broader problem” addressed by the Hatch-Waxman Act in deciding that a
generic company may assert the counterclaim provision of the Act when a brand company
impermissibly expands the scope of a use code accompanying a listed method patent). At least
partially, Senator Hatch’s original vision of rewarding a “successful challenger” instead of a “mere
first filer” will come alive if a final, favorable IPR decision is recognized as a court decision trigger.
See generally Examining the Senate and House Versions of the “Greater Access to Affordable
Pharmaceuticals Act,” Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., at 2-3 (Aug. 1,
2003) (Statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch).
139 See N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-70 (1982) (“This doctrine
may be explained in part by reference to the traditional principle of sovereign immunity, which
recognizes that the Government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued. (citations omitted).
But the public-rights doctrine also draws upon the principle of separation of powers, and a historical
understanding that certain prerogatives were reserved to the political Branches of Government. . . .
The understanding of these cases is that the Framers expected that Congress would be free to commit
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patent right is a matter of public concern.140 That is especially true where a patent
confers a marketing exclusivity in such an area of public health. 141 By corollary,
therefore, a court must recognize and give full effect to an Article I adjudication of a
pharmaceutical patent’s validity, a task historically conducted by the judicial branch
under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The reasoning in Thomas is illuminating.142 The case involved a federal statute
regulating “follow-on” pesticide registration.143 The challenge pertained to the
constitutionality of a provision in the statute that required binding arbitration of
certain disputes.144 The Court held that the matter fell under the public rights
exception because “[u]se of a registrant's data to support a follow-on [pesticide]
registration serves a public purpose as an integral part of a program safeguarding the
public health.”145 Thus, Article I adjudication was deemed to be proper.146

such matters completely to non-judicial executive determination, and that as a result there can be no
constitutional objection to Congress' employing the less drastic expedient of committing their
determination to a legislative court or an administrative agency.”) In this case, the Court adopted a
limited definition of public right that was sufficient to resolve the case. Id. Accordingly, the Court held
that public right is the one that “at a minimum” arises between the government and others. Id.
Subsequent cases, however, have expanded on that definition by eliminating the requirement that the
government be a party in the dispute. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Products Co., 473 U.S.
568, 586 (1985) (“Insofar as appellees interpret [Northern Pipeline] and Crowell [v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22 (1932)] as establishing that the right to an Article III forum is absolute unless the Federal
Government is a party of record, we cannot agree.”).
140 See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[T]he grant of a valid
patent is primarily a public concern. Validity often is brought into question in disputes between
private parties, but the threshold question usually is whether the PTO, under the authority assigned
to it by Congress, properly granted the patent. At issue is a right that can only be conferred by the
government.” (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50, 52 (1932)), on reh'g, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir.
1985)); see also Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971) (“A
patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. . . . [It] is an exception to the general rule
against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open market. The far-reaching social and
economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that
patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that
such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.” (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v.
Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)); see generally Amelia Smith
Rinehart, Patent Cases and Public Controversies, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 361 (2013) (“A patent could
be described as a private solution to a public problem--the government grants to an inventor a private
exclusive right to his invention for a limited time in order to encourage the promotion of progress to
benefit the public as a whole. . . . Some members of the public might like to practice the invention
without consequence--this group could include competitors, hopeful market entrants, patent licensees,
or even strangers to the patent owner. Other people might believe that the patent harms them and
others (including the government sovereign itself) by restricting competition and limiting innovation
or by offending on moral or ethical grounds.”) By contrast, a debtor’s state common law counterclaim
is not a matter of public right, and its adjudication in bankruptcy court is unconstitutional. See Stern
v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011).
141 Cf. Rinehart, supra note 140, at 387-90 (2013) (recognizing the “public health concerns” in
invalidity cases involving patents covering genetic subject matter, therapeutic food, and genetically
modified food).
142 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Products Co., 473 U.S. at 589-90.
143 Id. at 571-75.
144 Id. at 576.
145 Id. at 589.
146 Id.
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Thomas is the closest analogy here.147 Under Thomas’s reasoning, Congress
would have the authority to remove from the Hatch-Waxman scheme the task of
adjudicating patent validity and assigning it to PTAB.148 To deem otherwise would be
to quarantine patent validity disputes under the Hatch-Waxman Act to the four walls
of an Article III court and thereby defeat the efficiency and housekeeping goals of
AIA.149
Relatedly, in Patlex Corp., the patent owner challenged the constitutionality of
the retroactively operating reexamination statute, asserting that he had made
significant business investments in reliance on the grant of the patent under the
previous statute.150 But the Federal Circuit upheld the statute. 151 Significantly, the
court held that that statute was “curative” and that “a defectively examined and
therefore erroneously granted patent must yield to the reasonable Congressional
purpose of facilitating the correction of governmental mistakes.” 152
In the Hatch-Waxman context, an exclusivity-conferring patent is important in
the big-picture scheme of incentivizing and heralding generic drugs before patent
expiration.153 And the first filer may have some legitimate investment-backed
expectations.154 Nonetheless, the AIA could be viewed as curative of 180-day
exclusivities that may exist due to governmental mistakes.
Finally, pulling the trigger as proposed here will have to be accomplished through
the barrel of the Federal Circuit, an Article III court. While public rights adjudication
does not require judicial review,155 the schematic explained in subsection A above
entails an Article III nod. That further legitimizes giving a final, favorable IPR
decision the status of a court decision trigger.

Id. at 589-90.
See id. at 589 (“Congress has the power, under Article I, to authorize an agency administering
a complex regulatory scheme to allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the
program without providing an Article III adjudication.”)
149 See id. at 590 (“’To hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to
furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of
fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency
specially assigned to that task.’” (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)).
150 See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 600 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The grant of [the] patents
in 1977 and 1979 triggered activities by [the patent owner], such as the negotiation of licenses and
the suing of accused infringers, in accordance with and in reliance on the patent statute then in
existence. Relying on what he viewed as the bundle of rights and attributes encompassed by Title 35
as it stood in 1977 and 1979, [the patent owner] acted in accordance with the existing law. [The patent
owner] asserts that the retroactive application of Public Law 96-517 deprived him of the rights that
he was actively proceeding to enforce,” on reh'g, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
151 Id. at 603-04.
152 Id.
153 See Ohly & Patel, supra note 4, at 117-18.
154 See Upadhye, supra note 16, at 1318-19.
155 See generally Mila Sohoni, Agency Adjudication and Judicial Nondelegation: An Article III
Canon, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1569, 1589-94 (2013) (distinguishing cases involving private rights from
those involving public rights).
147
148
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C. Legislative Amendment
Such compelling practical and policy rationales notwithstanding, an court may
decline to recognize a final, favorable IPR decision as a court decision trigger because
of lack of express congressional authorization. In that event, Congress should consider
an amendment to the 180-day exclusivity forfeiture provision empowering courts and
instructing the FDA to recognize a final, favorable PTAB decision as a forfeiture trigger
in an ANDA case.

